The AfD has established itself at the top on the Sunday question, partly on par and partly ahead of the Union. The economy, on the other hand, is still not growing properly. What is increasing are corporate bankruptcies – on one Ten-year high. There is a risk of horrendous costs and premium increases in care, health insurance and pensions. The federal government is piling up record debts, while at the same time there are large gaps in the core budget, but all of this without noticeably increasing the country’s competitiveness. The autumn of reforms became one of reforms.
Meanwhile, Minister of Labor explains Bärbel Bas the employers to the class enemy. And the Chancellor has to threaten an invasion by the Russians a united cabinet decision on pensions to get through his group at all. They are correspondingly catastrophic Approval ratings for Friedrich Merz and his coalition. Even from one “Chancellor Twilight” was the last thing mentioned.
2025? All in all, it was a year to forget. And there is little reason to hope that 2026 will be much better, apart from vague declarations of intent from those in power. Maybe looking back will help, because there was always a crisis. Perhaps a rumbling government is much more the norm in the Federal Republic than the exception.
The colleague Christoph Schwennicke recently recalled something that most people have long since forgotten: how miserable the red-green government started in office in 1998. Barely a year after taking over the business, a certain Oskar Lafontaine quit as finance minister, member of the Bundestag and SPD leader because he could not agree on the basic principles of fiscal policy with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Added to this were the egos of Joschka Fischer and Jürgen Trittin at the cabinet table. “It was (…) pure madness,” sums up Schwennicke, who was a reporter in Bonn at the time South Germans.
This text is certainly not intended to be a general indulgence for bad governance. But what if the German love of stability, reliability and continuity is one thing above all: a story that people in Germany have told themselves so often that they have begun to believe it – regardless of the fact that the collective memory drags down one or another historical fact?
Take Angela Merkel for example. She led a grand coalition between 2017 and 2021, which, as one of those involved confidently admits today, lasted four years simply because, firstly, there was plenty of money and secondly, Corona burst in and outshone everything. Before that had to SPDagainst the will of its base, was forced into government by the Federal President in the first place and then lost three party leaders (Schulz, Nahles, Walter-Borjans) within a few years.
The CDU Chancellor, in turn, threatened to throw out her Interior Minister Horst Seehofer because he wanted to close the borders to refugees. Meanwhile, he thought it would be a good idea to promote the then head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Hans-Georg Maaßen, in the Ministry of the Interior (which the SPD subsequently vetoed in a panic). And in Thuringia, Christian Democrats, together with the Höcke AfD, finally elected Thomas Kemmerich as head of government.
Two parameters have fundamentally changed
A chancellor – here: Chancellor! – deep in chaos, this was not an isolated incident. Mister economic miracle, Ludwig Erhard, was already at the end after three years as chancellor because, in the middle of the worst recession to date, his coalition partner FDP did not want to increase taxes and withdrew his ministers (So history rhymes after all). This was a government crisis when the republic was not even of age. After Erhard, the chancellorships of two of the most talented heads of government, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, fell apart prematurely. One failed because of a spy in his office, his successor failed again because of the FDP.
The facts may be a long time ago, but the evidence is clear: the Merz government is less historically bad. Rather, it is historically shockingly average. However, that is their big problem. Compared to the times of Erhard, Brandt, Schmidt, Schröder or Merkel, two parameters have changed fundamentally.
First, the US understands itself now more than opponents of the Federal Republic because as their protective power. And – secondly – the AfD is not just a systemic rival in parliament; At the same time, it also prevents the political self-organization of the center into two popular parties with reliable majorities. So the AfD – driven by a social media strategy that no one has yet been able to counteract – is helping to bring about the very fragile and crisis-prone conditions that it then blames on the established parties. In the pension dispute, the AfD got away with just pointing to the quarrels in the government instead of explaining where the more than 100 billion euros in additional costs for her own Pension concept should come here.
So what would be left for Merz and his coalition if they wanted to live up to their self-imposed claim as the “final patron of democracy”? A start would probably be: avoid mistakes and avoid debates that, based on the model of the city, only lead to outrage and losers. In addition, there is an urgent need for a different management of expectations: So far, the Chancellor has repeatedly been tempted to make maximum promises at a moment’s notice in order to convey that he has understood the seriousness of the situation – but, see citizen’s allowance or the heating law, the fulfillment of the maximum promises often ends up being much smaller than hoped. But that is a guarantee for frustration. Merz should rather remember the old motto “underpromise, overdeliver” own it – promise less but deliver more.
Above all, it is important to create awareness of the fact that every generation has had its crises – in order to find new seriousness while at the same time being as calm as possible.
If that’s not a New Year’s resolution.
